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The relationship between forensic science and legal adjudication is intricate mainly
because the need to inform fact-finders on issues going beyond the layman’s knowledge
poses challenges both on empirical and normative dimensions, in particular with regards
to the specific role and duties of the different participants in the legal process. While
rationality is widely upheld as one of the aspirations of the legal process across many
modern jurisdictions, a pending question is how to remedy the uneasy relationship
between general propositions (and knowledge claims) conditioning expert witness
testimony, and individualized decisions taken by fact-finders. The focus has hitherto
been put on the utilization of model-based and formal methods of reasoning while,
regrettably, the concepts of judgment and decision-making have not received equal
attention. A first aspiration of our paper will thus be to further clarify the nature of
this systemic relationship in the particular area of the legal process involving scientific
experts, by conducting a critical transversal analysis of current empirical, normative and
doctrinal understandings of expert witness testimony. As a second aim, we will use this
insight to argue in favor of the view that structural features of expert witness testimony
are embedded in a decision-making process, and that the understanding of this
decisional dimension is important for clarifying the respective roles of expert witnesses
and fact-finders, and for favoring their mutual understanding thereof. To substantiate
this perspective, and attest to its growing recognition as a frontier understanding, we
will provide real-world examples from forensic science reporting practice and policy
documents of professional bodies.
Keywords: expert evidence, legal process, decision analysis, normative approach, decision-making prerogative,
expert witness fallacy
“[Y]our degree of belief does not, by itself, dictate what you should say or do (. . .) A
rational decision about what to do requires more than the evidence you have” (Sober,
2008, at p. 7)
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INTRODUCTION
In law, as much as in other disciplines, the topics of judgment
and decision making (JDM) under uncertainty have both
a long-standing and lively debated history, on all common
levels of consideration, normative1, descriptive and prescriptive.
Qualitative verbal decision criteria, such as ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ (BRD), are typical examples that lend themselves for
study under these distinct perspectives. Most textbooks in the
field present standard legal decision criteria, but the competing
interpretations of the nature and logical structure of such terms
divides practitioners and scholars since decades. Normativists –
to name one of the groups of discussants– have analyzed
and expressed legal standards of decision in terms of formal
frameworks, such as (Bayesian) decision theory, since the
1960s (i.e., Kaplan, 1968). Their research led to interesting
analytical results, some of which confirm the meaningfulness of
conventional decision standards, such as the >50% probability
requirement for finding civil liability (e.g., Friedman, 1997;
Kaye, 1999). In such normative frameworks, minimal probability
thresholds required to justify particular decisions are tightly
bound to preferences among decision consequences through so-
called consistency relationships (e.g., Buchak, 2016). Formally,
these relationships amount to principles such as minimizing (or
maximizing) expected loss (or utilities). Substantial amount of
research (for a review see, e.g., Connolly, 1987) has been devoted
to the empirical investigation of the extent to which people’s
actual thinking and deciding in legal applications aligns to such
consistency relationships between, on the one hand, beliefs about
competing versions of the event of interest (i.e., hypotheses or
propositions), expressed in terms of probabilities, and on the
other hand preferences among decision outcomes2, expressed
in terms of utilities or losses. Such empirical work found that
there is a considerable mismatch between the decisions that
individuals were willing to make, that is decision behavior, and
the decisions that would be optimal according to the normative
account.
Further investigation of these results seems to have come to
halt because of the exhausted perspectives that they represent.
Normativists, for example, argue that precepts following from
logical considerations simply are not and cannot be invalidated
in principle by any mismatch with practically observable decision
behavior that there may be. According to this view, the poor
mapping of formal theories on legal adjudication does not
represent a failure, because description and explanation is not
one of the aspirations of these theories. Empiricists, in turn,
consider aspects of normative perspectives pointless because of
the absence of legal requirements in the first place that would
1In this paper, we understand the term ‘normative’ not in a legal sense (i.e.,
referring to a legal norm or precept), but in the way commonly understood in the
JDM literature of applied psychology, that is as a logical standard against which
people’s reasoning and decision making can be evaluated (e.g., Baron, 2008, 2012).
See also Hahn (2014) and Oaksford (2014) for accounts of normativism in the JDM
literature.
2By decision outcome we mean a decision taken in the light of a particular state of
nature. For example, the decision to convict a truly liable defendant is an accurate
decision outcome, whereas a guilty verdict for a truly innocent defendant is an
inaccurate decision outcome (i.e., a false conviction).
ask participants in the legal process to conform to aspects
such as the maximization or minimization of an expectation
of any quantity of interest, such as utility or loss (e.g., Allen,
2003). This suggests that there is an impasse between the reality
faced by legal practitioners and the many conceptual accounts
offered by decade-long legal research and scholarship in formal
approaches to inference and proof, including empirical studies by
experimental psychologists. Hence, contributing to a collection
in the area of judgment and decision making in this journal of
applied psychology poses not only a high burden of providing
original discussion. It also requires a clear statement of the scope
of enquiry within the broad perspectives of descriptive, normative
and prescriptive research.
We address this challenge by focusing our attention not
to the process of legal adjudication as a whole, in particular
ultimate issues to which most of the abovementioned decision-
theoretic research relates, but to the intersection between forensic
science and legal adjudication, in particular the form, content
and elicitation of forensic expert conclusions. The reason for
this is that, first, while debates over the appropriate approach
to the various dimensions in which legal adjudication seeks
optimization3 seem stalled, there are local instances of the
legal process, such as the use of specialized (forensic science)
evidence, that represent unresolved conceptual difficulties in
practical proceedings. Some of these difficulties are peculiar
to the intersection between science and the law, such as
the deferential versus educational approaches to deal with
specialized knowledge in the process (e.g., Miller and Allen,
1993). A second reason is that devising a coherent approach to
such challenges is an important preliminary to sound decisions
at higher levels in the process, of which forensic expertise
may be an integral part. By forensic evidence we mean,
throughout this paper, both physical/chemical and digital non-
replicable items of evidence, usable to help recipients of expert
information discriminate between competing propositions of
interest, or help reduce the pool of potential persons/objects
at the origin of a particular trace or item seized in relation
to an event of legal interest (criminal, civil, or administrative).
Examples for particular types of forensic traces are mentioned
in Section “Decision-Structures for Specific Evidence in Forensic
Science.”
In essence, our analysis will come down to, and articulates
what we will call ‘decision-structures.’ We show that decision-
structures, although normative in nature, conceptualize and
ascribe content to existing adjudicative practice, for they capture
the requirement of ‘specific evidence.’ Central to this argument
is that the proposed decisional perspective is not an end in
itself, but only a necessary preliminary to understanding the
reason for and justification of counter-current positions, such as
the call to abandon some traditional expert reporting formats;
especially categorical conclusions that usurp the epistemic rights
of fact-finders. This result will call into question the extent
and scope of some of the current and most longstanding
forensic science reporting schemes. To redirect such forensic
3See, e.g., Allen (2015) for an account on dimensions such as the organization of
trials, governance, social concerns, and enforcement issues.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2073
fpsyg-09-02073 October 29, 2018 Time: 15:6 # 3
Biedermann and Kotsoglou Decisional Dimensions in Expert Witness Testimony
testimony on its proper track, recipients of expert information
need to assume a more active role in the processing of scientific
evidence, by insisting on their role as ultimate arbiters of
probative value in criminal trials, in particular by explicating
their exclusive epistemic duty to reach contextually structured
decisions.
Methodologically, we will rely on the view according
to which the logical and balanced assessment of scientific
evidence is a central part of forensic expert testimony.
Though, traditionally, this is said to involve probability as
a measure of uncertainty (e.g., Aitken et al., 2010), we will
adopt a broader perspective here and consider forensic expert
testimony as an instance of a normatively structured decision-
making process under uncertainty. Thus, we regard forensic
expert testimony not as an abstract and isolated object of
inquiry but blend it with considerations from actual forensic
practice (e.g., policy documents and practitioner guidelines).
This will also prompt us to assess the ways in which this
perspective may contribute to the improvement of frontier
understandings about the processing of scientific evidence in
legal adjudication.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section “Transversal
Overview of Current Empirical, Normative and Doctrinal
Understandings of Expert Witness Testimony” critically reviews
current perspectives on expert witness testimony. Using practical
examples, we will expose areas of interaction between forensic
science and the law where conflicting views about the form and
the content of expert testimony continue to pose challenges for
the legal resolution of disputes. Based on this initial diagnosis
we will argue, in Section “Decisional Dimensions of Forensic
Expert Testimony,” that considering expert testimony not merely
as an inference problem, but analyzed as a contribution to a
process of decision, dissolves key aspects of current controversies
without breach with either logical considerations or procedural
principles. Discussion and conclusions are presented in the last
section.
TRANSVERSAL OVERVIEW OF
CURRENT EMPIRICAL, NORMATIVE
AND DOCTRINAL UNDERSTANDINGS
OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Key Controversies Over Selected
Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony
Traditionally, forensic science is regarded as a collection of
applied scientific methods and techniques for the purpose of
assisting the judiciary in specialized matters where it lacks
relevant knowledge and expertise. While science and technology
are subject to continuous change and development, conceptual
questions gravitating around the quantification and weighing of
scientific findings tend to concentrate on a singular, well settled
perspective. Evett (2009, p. 159, emphasis as in original) has
expressed this perspective as follows: “the single most important
advance has nothing to do with technology [...]. It tells us the
most important lesson for the logic of evaluative forensic science:
consider the probability of the evidence, given the proposition.”
How could such a simple sentence – at least at first sight – be
considered the most important lesson for evaluative forensic
science? A main reason is that it clearly delineates the area
of competence of the expert, as noted by Margot: “[w]hether
these results [are] observed if one proposition for the event
is true rather than another proposition is the central relevant
matter on which the forensic scientist may comment” (Margot,
2011, p. 796). This focus is fundamentally different from that
of fact-finders who concentrate on propositions, given the
evidence (Robertson et al., 2016). Yet these different logical
conditionings, in particular evidence given target propositions
(and the reverse), trouble both scientists and recipients of expert
information since decades (Thompson and Schumann, 1987): it
is the archetype forensic science and legal adjudication example
for a normatively sound principle that is practically poorly
understood. Many past and recent initiatives, including efforts by
renowned scientific societies (e.g., Aitken et al., 2010), focus on
explaining and exemplifying these principles through guidelines,
recommendations and primer documents (e.g., The Council of
the Inns of Court [COIC] and The Royal Statistical Society [RSS],
2017).
Often, however, the above state-of-the-art occupies only
a side-arena of broader debates over forensic conclusion
formats, with different discussants pulling the rope in different
directions. Proponents in forensic fields that pursue the idea of
identification (also sometimes called ‘individualization’), provide
typical examples for this. Identification, in the present context,
is widely understood as the reduction of a pool of potential
sources (of a crime stain, mark or trace) to one and only one
single candidate (i.e., a person, object or tool). Examples of traces
are biological stains (e.g., blood, saliva, etc.), marks on fired
bullets, bite-marks, handwriting/signatures etc. and examples
of conclusions are ‘this DNA comes from this person,’ or ‘this
mark comes from this tool/person’ etc. The unscientific character
of such categorical conclusions (i.e., certainty assertions) has
been prominently exposed by Stoney (1991) in his landmark
paper “What made us ever think we could individualize using
statistics?”, but remains widely unrecognized. Not only are
identification/individualization conclusions by scientists logically
untenable, it has also been shown empirically that forensic
examiners, in many instances, cannot make such determinations
reliably, or at least exhibit a potential of error. This has
encouraged calls to initiate a paradigm shift (e.g., Saks and
Koehler, 2005), but the effect merely was to keep the topic
on the agenda, leaving fundamental changes by practitioners
pending, even in the light of subsequent, critical reports by the
National Research Council [NAS] (2009) and, more recently,
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
[PCAST] (2016).
This divide over forensic reporting formats also surfaces
on institutional levels, revealing the profound gaps between
legal and scientific proponents. Most recently, the Department
of Justice released a document entitled “Approved uniform
language for testimony and reports for the forensic latent
discipline” (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], 2018) which,
contrary to the above considerations, upholds bold statements
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such as “identification” and “exclusion”.4,5 This does not fit
well with the release, in 2016, by the Office of the Attorney
General (U.S. Department of Justice), of a memorandum to
advise against categorical conclusions (certainty conclusions of
the type mentioned above): “Department forensic laboratories
will review their policies and procedures to ensure that forensic
examiners are not using the expressions “reasonable scientific
certainty” or “reasonable [forensic discipline] certainty” in
their reports or testimony. Department prosecutors will abstain
from use of these expressions when presenting forensic reports
or questioning forensic experts in court unless required by
a judge or applicable law” (Office of the Attorney General,
U. S. Department of Justice [OAG], 2016). While this seems
to be a clear message, the position of scientists remains far
from uniform. For example, in a position statement regarding
the OAG memorandum, some practicing DNA scientists re-
asserted their adherence to categorical reporting formats (i.e.,
identifications), called ‘source attribution determinations’ (e.g.,
Moretti and Budowle, 2017). Unstated, however, remains the fact
that this statement is based on particular assumptions that, in
operational casework, are highly debatable (e.g., the omission of
the potential of error), thus making the position both peculiar
and difficult to defend. More generally, positions of this kind
represent only one side of the extremes that characterize the
concurrent streams of development in forensic science. Suffice to
notice, as a counter example, that Cole (2014, p. 144) concluded,
in a meticulous review of forensic (fingerprint) analysis practice,
that “forensic identification will have difficulty moving forward
until ‘individualization’ is really dead.” Such stark language also
continues to emanate from most recent discussions. A concise
illustration for this is given by Evett who, at a NIST colloquium
in 2017, has been quoted as saying “The identification paradigm
is going to die, because as scientists we realize there’s no basis for
it” (Champod and Evett, 2017).
Despite these fundamentally opposed views on forensic
expert conclusions, there is one common thread to which
all discussants appear to subscribe: the idea of contributing
to sound decision-making. Yet, strangely, current discussions
in both practice and literature almost exclusively focus on
questions about the nature, foundations and internal consistency
of expert witness testimony, leaving aside the crucial question
on how testimony interfaces with decision-making in the wider,
albeit structured and detailed context of legal adjudication.
We will critically expose this interface in further detail in
Section “Decisional Dimensions of Forensic Expert Testimony,”
introducing the notions of decisional dimension and forensic
decision structures. It is first necessary, however, to introduce
elements from law (see Section “Law of Evidence, Complexity
and Decision-Making Prerogatives”), in particular evidence law,
and considerations of how legal orders deal with science, as
exemplified by landmark decisions such as Daubert, followed
by its subsequent discussion by legal commentators (see Section
4Note that similar documents exist in other jurisdictions. An example is the
German ‘Standard of fingerprint identification’ [translation by the authors;
original title: ‘Standard des daktyloskopischen Identitätsnachweises’] [BKA
(Bundeskriminalamt), 2010].
5For a timely and critical review, see Cole (2018).
“Law and Philosophy of Science”). These preliminaries aim
at providing the wider scene wherein which the decisional
dimension of expert witness testimony, presented in Section
“Decisional Dimensions of Forensic Expert Testimony,” is to be
understood.
Law of Evidence, Complexity and
Decision-Making Prerogatives
As a preliminary, it is important to recognize that specialized
forms of evidence, such as forensic science evidence, are merely
instances of the broader challenge of evidence processing.
Notwithstanding, the intersection between forensic science and
legal (especially criminal) adjudication is often considered a
prime example for illustrating the ‘problem’ of specialized
knowledge, generally termed expert evidence (or, expert witness
testimony) throughout this paper. It is commonly understood
that the need to inform fact-finders on issues going beyond
the layman’s knowledge (see Section “Key Controversies
Over Selected Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony”) poses
challenges both on empirical and normative dimensions, in
particular with regard to the specific role and epistemic
duties and rights of the different participants in the legal
process.
The very possibility of accurate and efficient legal operations
hinges on the ability of fact-finders to recognize particular acts
and circumstances as instantiations of abstract legal concepts. It
is widely recognized that this capacity has reached new limits
in today’s technology-driven modern world, with its wide range
of socioeconomic activities. What is more, it is questionable
whether laypeople can appropriately comprehend evidential
items or phenomena and assess their informative contents with
respect to the contested facts of the case, when this requires
trained expert sensory capacities and specialized knowledge. The
technological advances of our age raise thus pressing questions
of competence: who should have the decision-making prerogative
regarding selected conclusions (e.g., regarding the origin of a
particular mark or stain, item of handwriting, etc.) when dealing
with items of evidence that require knowledge fact-finders do
not usually possess? This central issue will be addressed in later
Sections of this paper.
Interestingly, from a historic point of view, this is not
the first time that the increasing complexity of society and
compartmentalization of human knowledge place additional
strain on legal systems and the “good old way,” according to
which expert witnesses act simply as “helpers of the court”
(Thayer, 1892, p. 665). Legal history gives relevant insight into
the dynamics of the law of evidence (Golan, 1999). During the
Middle Ages, jurors in predominantly agricultural societies –
whose level of sophistication and technological advance was
not radically different from that of ancient communities –
were drawn from the immediate surroundings of the accused
(Langbein, 1996, p. 1170). The rationale underpinning this
adjudicative structure was the assumption that the jurors would
either be familiar with the allegation at play or they would be
able to investigate on their own. As small communities gave
their place to increasingly larger ones, the institution of self-
informing jurors underwent fundamental changes, for the law
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covered gradually broader areas of social life. There was simply
too much information to navigate and it was now passive fact-
finders, ignorant of the contested facts and essentially dependent
on witness testimony, who decided cases. These laypeople with
no direct knowledge of the facts were, obviously, in need
of judicial instructions regulating the routines for gathering
and assessing evidence, i.e., information, in order to render
a verdict. According to John Henry Wigmore, the law of
evidence grew, at this very moment, as procedural necessity and
doctrinal reality. It was, in other words, the dawning of the
instructional trial propelled by the need to acquire (specialized)
information that molded the law of evidence (Wigmore, 1908,
p. 692).
The complexity of legal proof seems to swing the pendulum
back in the direction of active rather than passive fact-
finders, suggesting that they are wearing this time the hat
of ‘expert witnesses.’ For the democratically legitimized and
from the legal order authorized professional judges or jury
cannot be the ones, so a general claim in forensic science, who
make so-called identification decisions (as defined in Section
“Key Controversies Over Selected Aspects of Forensic Expert
Testimony”). According to the deference model, fact-finders will
have – on the pain of irrationality – to delegate some of their
cognitive monopoly to experts, at least every time the contested
facts feature questions encroaching beyond the boundaries of
what is commonly known.
On a practical account, however, the notions of decision-
making prerogatives and deference lead to a critical impasse.
On the one hand, the procedural necessity of filling abstract
legal terms with valid (and reliable) empirical content highlights
the systemic relationship between legal adjudication, especially
criminal adjudication, and (forensic) science. For one of the
central tenets of modern legal orders, the Rationalist Tradition,
is the requirement that all decisions, which affect the interests
of individuals by resolving disputed questions of fact, are
justifiable (Twining, 1982). A decision-making process in which
the fact-finder does not properly understand the nature (e.g.,
statistical) and empirical content of evidence would be arbitrary
and have deleterious effects for the public confidence in the
integrity and accuracy of the legal system. Lord Steyn’s dictum
that “[c]ourts of law can only act on the best scientific
understanding of the day”6 entails the admission that fact-
finding can be as good as modern science allows it to be. On
the other hand, the relationship between the two symbiotic
partners is characterized by friction and antagonism. Forensic
scientists take the legal axiom ‘iudex non calculat’ quite
literally and deplore that traditional fact-finders (judges and
jurors) struggle with the proper understanding of scientific
methods, and science in general. At the same time, the state
of forensic science causes itself, in regular intervals, scorn,
and even ridicule.7 What is more, in her recent annual
report, the U.K. Forensic Science Regulator concluded that
6R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1997] 3 WLR 534, House of Lords, per Lord Steyn.
7See e.g. the recent negative publicity blitz strike at Jon Oliver’s political satire show
on the shortcomings of forensic science, Last Sunday Tonight, Season 4, Episode
25 (2017).
failing forensic science standards make “miscarriages of justice
inevitable.”8
The intermediate interrogation at this point thus is how to
move on from this impasse. In order to reflect further on this
systemic relationship and assist in finding ways to cope with
its difficulties, it is necessary to lay down some basic rules
of conduct. Articulating the structural features of a normative
platform favoring communication and mutual understanding
between juridical decision-makers and expert witnesses can
be seen as a mapping exercise, aiming at drawing normative
borders and allocating epistemic rights and duties. Between
fact-finders’ reaching beyond their legitimate scope of their
expertise on the one hand and expert witnesses trespassing
on the realm of the jury on the other hand, the challenge
is to strike a scientifically defensible and jurisprudentially fair
balance. But in order to avoid a mapping exercise to fall short
of practical considerations, it is necessary to take into account the
architecture of adversarial criminal adjudication,9 policy choices
and methodological axioms of science. What is more, rethinking
expert witness testimony has to take place during business-
as-usual operation, avoiding interference with the established
routines for generating, evaluating and validating knowledge
claims in legal adjudication. Adjusting the normative structure of
legal institutions to theoretically sophisticated models does not
mean that one is authorized to change the structure of dispute
resolution in autonomous legal orders. This perspective is not
limited to criminal adjudication as forensic evidence can also
play a crucial role in civil lawsuits (see, e.g., forensic document
examination in the case Zuckerberg v. Ceglia).
Law and Philosophy of Science
An analysis and discussion of forensic expert testimony is hardly
possible without devoting some comments to the relationship
between law and philosophy of science. The interest of the
former in theories in general, and in questions such ‘what is
science?’, is not restricted to academic circles. In fact, systems
of legal adjudication are pragmatically – and in terms of
substantive law – required to filter the admission of theories
in their proceedings. This is a relevant observation because
practitioners and forensic scientists will base propositions of
interest, to some extent, on theoretical models. The principal
issue with this is that in most jurisdictions it is the judge
rather than the respective scientific community that will
have to answer the question of (scientific) validity. Thus,
introducing elements of philosophy of science at this juncture
aims at further delimiting the focus of enquiry and clarify
the nature and the scope of the decisional account introduced
later in Section “Decisional Dimensions of Forensic Expert
Testimony.”
8See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/19/uk-police-forces-
failing-to-meet-forensic-standards-safe-regulator-miscarriages-justice-
outsourcing (01.25.2018).
9We do not wish to make any specific claim on the differences between adversarial
and continental systems of adjudication, given that from our structural point
of view, differences tend to disappear. For reasons of simplicity and in order
to provide concrete and comprehensible examples we will focus on adversarial
systems of criminal adjudication. See Damaska (1973) for more discussion.
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The engagement of courts with philosophy of science has
been hitherto rather light-hearted (Haack, 2014a, p. 141). But
the academic discussion too, had difficulty to comprehend the
scientific endeavor of expert witnesses against the background of
the model-based view of scientific enterprise. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling on Daubert10 is particularly pertinent in this
context as it has become a leading authority on monitoring
the reliability and validity of expert evidence in all US Federal
Courts and the majority of state jurisdictions. Most importantly,
it has generated a remarkable amount of academic discussion on
an international level, despite it not being directly relevant for
proceedings in other jurisdictions. In Daubert, the petitioners
(two minor children and their parents) had alleged that the
children’s serious birth defects had been caused by a prescription
drug marketed by the respondent. They also proposed to
adduce evidence of the testimony of eight experts to the effect
that the prescription drug can cause such side effects. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals relied on Frye’s
standard of admissibility,11 i.e., general acceptance, and declared
the evidence inadmissible. For there was extensive published
scientific literature on the subject that the maternal use of
Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth
defects.
The US Supreme Court declared that the rule of ‘general
acceptance’ had been invalidated by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The ruling signified departure from
Frye and reliance on “general acceptability,” for the Frye test
was superseded by the Rules’ adoption, in favor of a more
liberal approach. According to Rule 703, Justice Blackmun who
delivered the opinion of the Court said, the question that is
most pertinent for the court is whether “all scientific testimony
or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”12 Let us
stress that Daubert was about admissibility of the evidence, not
weight. Undeniably, admissible evidence does not predetermine
decisions. It changes, however, the dynamics of proof. The
Court explicitly coupled evidentiary relevance qua precondition
of admissibility and scientific validity. While the Court was at
pains to stress that the central issue is validity, not a specific
criterion thereof, it introduced a “flexible” inquiry encompassing
multiple and non-exhaustive factors, which, the Court reminds
us, do not “set out a definitive checklist or test.”13 Criteria such
as whether the theory or technique underpinning the evidence
has undergone testing and withstood the scientific process of
falsifiability; whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication in refereed journals; whether there is information
about its known or potential error rate; whether the theory
or technique enjoys the support of some relevant scientific
community or communities.14
Daubert has attracted wide criticism especially with regard
to the Popperean criterion of falsifiability with authors going
10Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). According to the old Frye Rule,
novel scientific testimony needed to be generally accepted in the relevant field in
order to be declared admissible.
12Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), at 589.
13Id., at 593.
14Id., at 580.
at great length to flesh out the philosophical argument. Allen
(1994, p. 1164) concisely remarked that the Court “replaced a
judicial anachronism [Frye] with a philosophical one [Popper].”15
Haack remarked, in the same tone, that Daubert’s “philosophy of
science was confused” (Haack, 2014b, p. 113). To some extent,
the unusual amount of criticism against Daubert overstates, in
our opinion, the importance of a single member of a non-
exhaustive set of criteria of validity, i.e., falsifiability. The inquiry
enshrined in Rule 702, Justice Blackmun clarifies, is a flexible
one and its overarching subject, to wit, scientific validity, cannot
be reduced to any single criterion.16 Falsifiability, peer-review
process etc. are simply indicators, not necessary and sufficient
conditions of scientific validity. The major change that Daubert
engineered is the shift from an externalist approach to scientific
evidence to an internalist one. Whereas for 70 years judges would
have to rely on the “general acceptance test,” they now need to
comprehend the empirical claims and underlying methodology,
for admissibility hinges on asserted scientific validity. It does not
follow, thus, that the Court subscribed to Popper’s conception of
science, for the Court did not answer authoritatively the question
of what constitutes ‘validity.’ Secondly, Daubert is important
for the contradistinction between science and legal adjudication.
While “[s]cientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision,”
the Court points out, “law . . . must resolve disputes finally and
quickly.”17 This remark raises more questions than it manages
to answer. For one, it seems to assume that science is on
a further end of some spectrum, investing more time and
resources than legal adjudication does. If this is true and we
can directly compare the two systems, one might wonder, then
how are we to avoid the conclusion that scientific methods
are superior to adjudicative ones? How could we justify the
limited role expert witnesses are required to play, when modern
legal orders equate parts of their testimony with trespassing
on the province of the jury? To tackle these questions in the
context of legitimacy of criminal adjudication, it is necessary
to take a closer look at the philosophy of science encoded in
Daubert.
Justice Blackmun seems thus to have placed some emphasis on
the criterion of falsifiability, and has attracted waves of criticism
ever since. A key question, he writes, in determining whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge and therefore reliable
and admissible in court, is whether it “can be falsified.”18 The
Popperean scent ascending from the criterion of falsification is
enhanced, for Justice Blackmun uses a direct quotation in his
next sentence: “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory
is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”19 While Popper
is a widely respected philosopher, especially among lawyers, his
views have, however, never had an actual impact on existing
and established methods for validation of scientific hypotheses.
As Kuhn (1996, p. 77) remarked, “[n]o process yet disclosed by
the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the
15Allen is in turn citing one of his students.
16Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), at 594.
17Id., at 597.
18Id., at 593.
19Id., at 593; Popper (1962, p. 37).
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methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison
with nature.”
But the criterion of falsification was not the only hint
to philosophy of science in Daubert. In the same paragraph
Justice Blackmun mentioned also Carl Hempel, a central figure
of Logical Positivism. This has been criticized as cherry-
picking of philosophical ideas (Haack, 2014a). On the one
hand, the criticism is justified, for there are major differences
between Hempel’s verificationism and Popper’s falsificationism.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court hit the nail on the
head, apparently without even realizing it, because both meta-
theoretical approaches share at least two structural features.
Firstly, the presupposition that theories are based on some
formal logical syntax, to wit, by carrying out axiomatization
of theories within formal languages. Secondly, the idea that
a scientific theory could be once and for all confirmed or
falsified through a direct comparison with a theory-external
criterion, i.e., a theory-neutral observational language. However,
phenomenal appearances can only be validated in the light
of a multitude of background assumptions (Jackson, 1988,
p. 557). The theory ladenness of all experiential data, i.e., one
of the radical insights of the second half of the 20th century,
necessitated the abandonment of the strict divide between
theoretical terms and observational ones. All in all, despite their
differences, these two approaches, i.e., Hempel’s verificationism
and Popper’s falsificationism, can be regarded from the stance
of philosophy of science as the two main phases of the syntactic
view of theories which dominated the first half of the previous
century. The syntactic view of theories (Received View) with
its phantasies of an ideal language comprising concepts with
sharp boundaries, which dominated the field of philosophy until
the 1950s, and its underlying logicism overestimated the power
of formal logic. What is more, it failed to give a practicable
account of actual and successful scientific theories (Suppe, 2000,
p. S103). The latter are not axiomatic systems yielding deductively
derived consequences, and scientific practitioners have more
moderate requirements for scientific validity than a “relentless
accumulation of confirming instances” (Toulmin, 1967, pp. 110–
111). Scientific propositions are not based on strict unexceptional
‘laws,’ but on generalizations. The semantic view of theories, in
turn, which has been dominant since the last quarter of the 20th
century, is a formal reaction to the syntactic view of theories
(Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 126). It is remarkable, that both Courts and
the academic discussion appear to have largely failed to register
this major development, i.e., the fact that “[m]odels occupy
central stage” (?, p. 44) in philosophy of science.
Let us synthesize the above. According to the model-based
view of scientific enterprise, theories are not empirically un-
interpreted formal-axiomatic systems but involve a central
interpretative aspect. In other words: theories are not fully
axiomatized systems which eliminate the need for discretion in
science let alone in legal adjudication. This highlights the need to
outline the area of admissible interpretation for expert witnesses
and fact-finders. Further, scientific models do not consist in the
accumulation of instances who either confirm or fail to falsify
a given hypothesis once and for all. An essential feature of
modeling is to generalize. Generality, understood as the property
of applying widely, plays a pivotal role in philosophy of science
(Lewis and Belanger, 2015). Furthermore, it is important to
understand the inversely proportional character of generality and
precision. As Gleick (1998, p. 278) points out: “The choice is
always the same. You can make your model more complex and
more faithful to reality, or you can make it simpler and easier
to handle.” This trade-off, however, is, no matter the outcome,
subject to certain restrictions. The purpose of any model is
to generalize and reduce reality to meaningful theoretical (i.e.,
general) propositions. A map which would be as accurate as the
landscape itself would be a contradiction in terms. We can hold,
therefore, that there is a point where any general account of
the world breaks down. That point is the individual case. This
insight, which is methodologically rather trivial but as regards its
consequences radical, helps us realize the different dynamics and
aspirations between legal adjudication and scientific endeavor.
DECISIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
FORENSIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Discretion in Law
Legal Conclusions and Decisions Versus Scientific
Determinism: The Need for Discretion
As argued in Section “Transversal Overview of Current
Empirical, Normative and Doctrinal Understandings of Expert
Witness Testimony,” the function of any model providing
scientific explanation is (i) to generate generalizable propositions
(conclusions), presuming that “events occur in consistent
patterns” (National Research Council [NAS], 2009, p. 111), (ii) to
establish symmetry across members of a target system, and (iii) to
eliminate the need for case-by-case treatment of individual cases.
The validity of a general proposition, i.e., its scientific character,
is a function of its derivability from a scientific model to such an
extent that the very expression ‘ad hoc explanation’ strikes us as
quite peculiar, indeed as a contradiction in terms. Singularities,
where physical laws break down, are deeply troublesome for
scientific theories. The question, then, is whether the fact-finder’s
decision about unique historical events is also generalizable.
From Aristotle, who observed that it is “foolish to accept
probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from
a rhetorician [i.e., lawyer] scientific proof,”20 to modern forensic
scientists who are at pains to stress that the idea of a frequency
being attached to an outcome for a single event is “ridiculous”
(Lucy, 2006, p. 5), scholars have continuously rejected (bogus)
claims of generality when it comes to legal decisions. However, we
will need more than aphorisms, in order to draw a line between
fact-finding in legal adjudication and scientific inquiry.
The fact that legal systems, especially in our increasingly
complex world, are unable to, indeed not particularly interested
in predicting and axiomatizing every combinatorial possibility
of circumstances that the future may bring – this would be
computationally intractable – is an enduring lesson we have
learnt from the failures of legal orders that placed exclusive
emphasis on casuistry and tried to provide an all-encompassing
20Aristotle Nic Ethics i3, 1094b.
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solution to the problem of decidability by enacting exhaustive
lists of elements falling under a legal concept ‘ϕ’.21 The (vain)
effort to provide an ontological map of semantics of legal
concepts aimed at the elimination of discretion and predicated a
fact-finder/judge who would effectively be ‘the mouth of the law.’
However, this presupposes a world comprising a finite number
of features, so that we could lay down rules for each combination
individually. As Hart put it, “[p]lainly this world is not our world”
(Hart, 1961, p. 128). Explication of legal terms, including “proof,”
is highly contextual. Securing a maximum degree of predictability
(and therefore: legal certainty) comes at the price of “freezing”
the meaning of legal terms by settling in advance issues before
they arise. This would provide maximum legal certainty in lieu
of paradoxical results, such as for example the prohibition of an
ambulance entering a park, pursuant to the rule “No vehicles in
the park.” The rigidity of various legal classifications, e.g. what
constitutes ‘proof,’ would make legal orders instantly obsolete and
unfit for resolving new questions that will inevitably emerge in
litigation. In a world characterized by a radically unpredictable
future, every deterministic approach to legal concepts – let us
mention again that from the point of view of the law, ‘proof ’ is
a legal concept – would be in need of revision moments after its
enactment in order to catch the multitude of situations that occur
in real life, and keep abreast of social developments. The whole
field of legal methodology and legal dogmatics grew out of the
ashes of legislative projects that tried to eliminate discretion only
to fail utterly.
Modern legal orders have internalized the message that it is
futile to anticipate decisions.22 Admittedly, deduction from rules
with predetermined meaning, elimination of discretion and the
description of judge’s/fact-finder’s activity in logico-mechanical
terms are features routinely attributed to juridical operations.
The problem, however, is that these features derive from a rather
superficial understanding of normative systems. Indeterminacy is
not a surface feature of law but is inherent in natural languages.
It is for this reason that logicians traditionally stress that truth
values can be defined only within formal languages (Tarski, 1944).
The dynamic process of increasing or decreasing the generality of
legal rules inevitably runs into a point of bifurcation, where no
decision either way is “dictated” by the applicable norm(s) (Hart,
1961). Notwithstanding the fact that the respective factfinder
will probably have (good) reasons to reach the – in his or her
opinion – right decision, from the point of view of the law there
can only be a set of equally reasonable decisions. The applicable
legal norm or standard in question is simply a “frame” within
which various possibilities are given. The verdict, Kelsen explains,
is on a thorough look an “individual norm,” valid exclusively
21The fact that legal systems operating in complex environments are unable
to anticipate the future and contain rules allowing for exceptions incapable of
exhaustive statements is a historic lesson we have learnt at least since the Prussian
Legal Code (1794) with its more than 19,000 paragraphs.
22For example, the Criminal Law Revision Committee for England and Wales
[CLRC] (1980) [Fourteenth Report, Offences against the Person (1980), Cmnd
7844, para 37] emphasized that they are “extremely hesitant about embodying in
a statute (which is not always susceptible of speedy amendment) an expression
of present medical opinion and knowledge derived from a field of science which
is continually progressing and inevitably altering its opinions in the light of new
information.”
with regard to the individual case, i.e., not generalizable (Kelsen,
1934, para 36). At this very point, axiomatized systems break
down, for the fact-finder needs to make a decision, which is not
warranted by the underlying logical framework. Particular cases,
Hart remarks, do not make themselves fit for legal subsumption,
“already marked off from each other,” or shouting at us: ‘I am
an instance of the general rule’ (Hart, 1961, p. 126). Rules,
including legal rules, do not provide the (meta-)rules for their
own application.23 The gap between rational conclusions based on
scientific models and personal decisions about disputed facts can
only be filled by an act of will (Kelsen, 1934, para 5), which is not
a necessary outcome of a justificatory chain. We will come back
to this important point.
It is worth keeping in mind that an uncontradicted model-
based proposition can be rejected only on pain of irrationality.
This is the essence of the deference model in forensic science.
A fact-finder cannot simply disregard the justified conclusion
(decision structure) of an expert witness testimony, say, on
the assigned probative value of some biological trace. However,
decisions behave in a different way. They are not rationally
resolvable, for reasonable minds may differ. Disagreement about
the ‘one right decision’ does not necessarily imply an error in
the justificatory process, since the logical chain of justification
leads to a point of progress branching with mutually incompatible
growing paths which the decision-maker can follow (Stegmüller,
1979, p. 33). The fact-finder has the epistemic duty to exercise
discretion and resolve an issue by making a decision. Scholars
who deny this fundamental insight are obliged to postulate
caricatures of judges with “superhuman intellectual power”
(Dworkin, 1986, p. 239). What is more, discretion is not an
exclusive feature of law. The historian of science Kuhn has
promoted a similar view. He emphasized the role of value
judgments and decisions in the course of scientific development.
E.g., debates over theory-choice, he says, “cannot be cast in a
form that fully resembles logical or mathematical proof” (Kuhn,
1996, p. 199). There is no algorithm, e.g. for choosing the level of
significance (3σ or 5σ), in an experiment.24 E.g., the existence of
the Higgs particle is proved qua outcome of empirical research.
Yet the underlying and staggering level of significance (5σ) is not
itself a scientific fact; it is a convention and as such a matter of
choice rather than of “purely theoretical reasons” (Stegmüller,
1979, p. 35).
The Values of (Criminal) Law
The previous considerations allow us to, first, articulate a
principal source of confusion in discussions around expert
witness testimony, and, secondly, explicate the decision-making
prerogative alias burden of decision. Legal adjudication does not
aim at, or aspire to answer empirical questions in a general way.
It is not a shorter or less costly method of knowledge-claim
validation. Its function and social task is to resolve, within a
reasonable amount of time, a legal issue deriving from contested
factual claims. Legal orders set general criteria, which, when met,
23Interestingly, the same holds for formal analytical frameworks, such as
probability and decision theory.
24However, there is argument, at least in forensic science, to the effect that
frequentist significance levels ought not to be used (e.g., Taroni et al., 2016).
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authorize an official to impose a legal effect. The difficulty resides
in the fact that the question when these general criteria (‘exclusion
of reasonable doubts’ or ‘being sure’) are actually met, cannot
be answered in the abstract. Social reality is complex and too
context-sensitive for an algorithmic or axiomatized approach.
Accordingly, the decision-making prerogative in actual cases
refers to the responsibility to resolve an issue, not despite but
because it is not replicable and therefore not subject to scientific
analysis in the traditional sense. There is no univocal answer
to the question of legal liability and proof because the question
as such is not scientific, not because the underlying issue is
obscure.25
Each legal order qua autonomous normative system will
have to make a basic policy choice on who will take the
responsibility and resolve a scientifically unresolvable – though
scientifically describable – issue. The respective choice is not
answerable to eternal and unalterable laws, but subject to
historical contingencies, political balances and outcomes of social
conflict. There is no a priori or scientifically valid reason to give
the decision-making prerogative to professional judges, laypeople
or experts, i.e., to opt for the educational or deference model.
A decision is based on, albeit is not derivable by scientific
propositions. It is pillared by the act of will of the respective
official, who is authorized to make a decision, although no
decision is logically necessitated by the underlying normative
framework (Kelsen, 1934).
Utilizing an act of will does not mean that decision-making
implies an anything-goes activity. Decisions are neither logically
warranted, nor are they a step into the void. Each legal order has
its own internal values, which the juridical decision-maker has
to implement. The law especially criminal law and the criminal
standard of proof are heavily influenced by policy considerations.
The US Supreme Court has famously spelled out this dependency
in the benchmark decision In Re Winship, which describes the
reasonable doubt standard as “a prime instrument for reducing
the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”26 The standard
of proof (in a liberal legal order) reflects thus the increased social
disutility of convicting a law-abiding citizen person. As Justice
Harlan put it in his concurring opinion, the function of the
standard of proof is to influence “the relative frequency of these
two types of erroneous outcomes,” knowing that the two types of
error (acquitting the perpetrator and convicting the innocent) are
inversely proportionate.27 Similar considerations apply to almost
every modern legal order.
Liberal legal orders, as opposed to authoritative ones, value
the individualistic perspective, and the requirement that legal
evidence has to be ‘specific’ cannot be sidestepped. As Justice
Antonin Scalia put it, statistical evidence “is worlds away from
[legally] ‘significant proof ’.”28 The idea that some scientifically
validated (general) proposition guarantees the factual and
normative rectitude of a verdict (decision) creates a “major
25For a clarification of this point in the context of forensic identification see, for
example, Biedermann et al. (2008, Section 5.2).
26In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Opinion of the Court (Brennan, J.), at 363.
27Id., Harlan, J., Concurring Opinion, at 371–372.
28Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al., 564 U.S. 338 (2011), Opinion of the Court
(Scalia), at 14.
contradiction between the scientific status that is claimed and
the operational paradigm to which its practitioners subscribe”
(Champod and Evett, 2001, p. 101). It is worth reminding
that related discussion exists in the area of clinical decision-
making, where it has become increasingly clear that despite
common assumptions, ‘diagnostic slam-dunks’ and absolute
certainty are the rare exception rather than the rule. Given
the inevitable element of uncertainty in a typical diagnosis,
the physician will be able to express, in a warranted way,
merely the probabilistic support for some medical condition,
e.g. tuberculosis, as compared to relevant alternative hypotheses.
But the evidence alone, and the subsequent grade of belief, will
not necessitate what should be done (Sober, 2008, pp. 4–5). The
primary interest of a patient is the choice of therapeutic measures,
not the probability of any disease. As Sober remarks, answering
the question ‘What should I do?’ requires more than data and
grades of belief. It requires the input of values (Sober, 2008, p. 4).
The question whether the diagnosed condition corresponds with
the true state of affairs and the related question, which treatment
should be preferred, requires and instigates an inferential leap.
Prominent forensic scientists call this step “a leap of faith”
(Stoney, 1991, p. 198). (Forensic) scientists are, therefore, not
better equipped than laypeople, to take this step by making a
decision under uncertainty.
Forensic Reporting
Decision-Structures for Specific Evidence in Forensic
Science
We can now exemplify our perspective on decision-structures by
considering examples from forensic science reporting practice.
We will focus on results of forensic DNA analyses that,
despite critiques, are widely considered as a principal type of
evidence, especially in criminal proceedings. The high variability
of forensic DNA profiles between individuals has made it an
attractive candidate for supporting claims of individualization.
Traditionally, this goal has been conceived as the heart and soul
of forensic science (Kirk, 1963, p. 236), and is also very common
among other trace categories such as fingermarks, handwriting
and the like, including also more recent trace types, such as digital
traces.
Related to individualization is the notion of uniqueness
which, however, is not an operable term in ordinary criminal
adjudication. This hinges on methodological issues of the
standard ways in which forensic scientists analyze biological
traces. Forensic DNA profiling results reflect an individual’s
genetic features at various points of comparison, the so-called
loci. But since only a tiny part of the entire DNA-molecule is
analyzed, an eventual correspondence between the profile of a
crime stain and that of a person of interest is, per definition
only partial, and does not establish that the person of interest
is the source of the crime stain (Redmayne, 1995, p. 464). This
is especially the case for incomplete DNA traces (e.g., degraded
trace material), or mixtures of DNA composed of material
from more than one contributor. The probative value of DNA
profiling results will thus be explicitly probabilistic, and it is
essential to understand that probative value is based on the
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notion of conditional genotype probabilities (hereinafter: CGP).
The latter is a technical notion that expresses the probability of
observing the DNA characteristics on the crime stain (i) given
that an unknown person (i.e., different from the suspect or
person of interest) is the source of the crime stain, (ii) given
the task-relevant information available on the case file, and
(iii) given additional considerations related to forensic genetic
theory (Evett et al., 2000). The forensic biologist’s assessment
thus focuses on the probability of observing corresponding
DNA characteristics in an unknown person from the relevant
population (i.e., the population to which the source of the
crime stain is thought to belong), which may be Caucasians,
Chinese etc.29 The probabilistic character of the respective report
highlights the importance of distinguishing sharply between
using a model to describe, in a general way, a phenomenon (i.e.,
the kind of genetic features observable on the crime stain) on
the one hand, and using such information in order to make a
legally structured and procedurally contextualized decision on the
other hand. This categorical distinction has already been drawn
by criminal courts.30 Schematically, thus, two different questions
regarding DNA evidence are commonly of interest:
(1) What is the probability that an individual will be observed
to have the DNA profile features of interest as seen in the
trace given that this person was chosen at random from the
population of interest?
(2) What is the probability that a given individual is truly
the offender (or, the source of the crime stain), given that
corresponding DNA features between the profile of that
person and the profile of the crime stain have been reported?
It is worth mentioning that in the first question, the factual
innocence of the person of interest is taken for granted and
one asks what the CGP is, whereas in the second question one
takes the corresponding DNA features (i.e., the forensic findings)
for granted and envisages the ascription of criminal liability (or,
inference of source). As anticipated in Section “Key Controversies
Over Selected Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony,” the widely
known prosecutor’s fallacy consists in transforming the answer
to the first question into an answer of the second one. The
prosecutor’s fallacy is, however, not the only misinterpretation
that one may make in relation to the above two questions.
The further source of methodological error (and procedural
violation) is what may be referred to as the ‘expert witness’s
fallacy,’ which refers to the situation in which forensic experts
testify even further beyond the area of their expertise. This occurs,
specifically, when experts purport to answer both questions,
although they are legitimized to answer only the first. This
sidesteps the understanding that “a sharp distinction can be made
between what one ought to think about a proposition [. . .] and
what one actually decides [. . .] the former is a problem that
29Such probabilities may become increasingly small, in particular smaller than
one over several world populations, intriguing some commentators, including
scientists, to assert individualization (i.e., uniquely assigning a person as the source
of a given biological trace). However, such claims are unfounded because they take
values produced by a biological model, operated at an extreme end of extrapolation
and, thus, beyond what may be empirically investigated, as face values.
30R. v. Deen, The Times January 10.
pertains to probabilistic reasoning whereas the latter is one that
applies to decision making” (Biedermann et al., 2008, p. 23).
Interestingly, though not coincidentally, the above two
separate questions map on the distinctive epistemic duties for
expert witnesses and jury. The expert witness, the Court of
Appeal in England and Wales makes clear, “should not be
asked his opinion on the likelihood that it was the defendant
who left the crime stain, nor when giving evidence should he
use terminology which may lead the jury to believe that he is
expressing such an opinion.”31 The expert witness, in other words,
is logically warranted and legally authorized to express only
the information regarding the probative value of the scientific
findings (not an opinion regarding the truth or otherwise of the
propositions of interest). Such information may take the form of,
for example, the CGP, or a measure that is a function thereof. The
situation is different, however, with the second question. Even in
the factually remote, but epistemically possible case, where the
correspondence would extend to more features than are included
in traditional DNA profiles, and the source of the DNA is not
contested by the adversarial parties, the question of liability would
still not have been answered. Further considerations need to be
taken into account for reasoning to such higher propositional
levels, such as the relevance of the evidential material for the
offense of interest (Stoney, 1994). In essence, associating a person
of interest with evidential material, as such, does not answer any
ultimate issue (i.e., a substantive element of an offense).32
This does not necessarily mean that the expert witness would
be excluded in advance from answering non-scientific questions.
The point merely is that there is no obvious reason to believe
that expert witnesses would be any better than laypeople in
answering questions such as individualization or liability. As
Cole puts it, “the expert has no special competence greater than
that of any other person at the decision stage of the process”
(Cole, 2014, p. 143). Practically, one should even expect experts
to be in a less informed position compared to the jury, because
only the latter oversees the case as a whole. But again, it is the
divide between reasoning about propositions, on the one hand,
and actually making a decision regarding those propositions of
interest, on the other hand, which poses both conceptual and
procedural hurdles, and this clarifies why the expert is not in the
position to act at the stage of decision. Guilt is not a (scientific)
proposition, but a verdict, which is the result of a decision under
uncertainty made after considering all elements of the case. The
allocation of the decision-making prerogative is, intrinsically, a
policy choice rather than a scientific mandate. Legal orders may
choose freely whom they entrust with this important legal duty of
deciding on the defendant’s liability, without violating any logical
or methodological principles of scientific inquiry.
Forensic scientists who – on an industrial scale – make
categorical claims in terms of so-called individualization
conclusions (see Section “Key Controversies Over Selected
Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony”) with respect to the
31R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369, 374.
32Rule 704(b) makes this point explicit when it states that “[i]n a criminal case,
an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or
did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime
charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2073
fpsyg-09-02073 October 29, 2018 Time: 15:6 # 11
Biedermann and Kotsoglou Decisional Dimensions in Expert Witness Testimony
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, are wrong both in
terms of methodological underpinnings and the law. They seem
to conflate individualization qua ontological claim – according
to which there is no other person who could be found to
correspond to the particular DNA profile observed in the case
at hand – and individualization qua epistemic claim leading
to a definitive conclusion that has potentially decisive impact
on the verdict (Saks and Koehler, 2008, pp. 211–219).33 It is a
longstanding, though still not widely appreciated, fundamental
insight that for moving from the evidence to an individual as the
proclaimed source of an item or trace, a leap of faith is required.
To this we add, through our discourse here, that such forensic
conclusions can also be framed as decisions, requiring an act of
will (see Section “Decision-Structures for Specific Evidence in
Forensic Science”). This adds further support to the argument
that requiring expert witnesses to confine themselves to their area
of responsibility as outlined from the respective legal order is not
a deliberate dogmatic choice, but both a logical and procedural
necessity. Anything else would amount to trespassing onto the
province of the jury.34
By arguing that the concept of individualization, salient in
forensic science, actually comes down to a decision, and as such
hinges on an act of will, it is not denied that a decision can
and should be scientifically backed. The point solely is that the
scientific model used to articulate the respective target system
is only a conditio sine qua non for any decision in a system of
legal adjudication with commitments to Rationalism. It is not,
however, a conditio per quam for the respective decision. Expert
witnesses inform and educate the fact-finder/juridical decision
maker but are not entitled to anticipate their decision. As Lord
President Cooper put it, it is the expert witness’s duty “to furnish
the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing
the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury
to form their own independent judgment by the application of
these criteria to the facts proved in evidence.”35 This is a matter of
actual and contingent and yet valid policy choice, not a misguided
and sub-rational pre-scientific operation. Interestingly, even the
pioneering forensic scientist Locard supported the view that the
laboratory should not become the “antechamber” of the court
(Locard, 1940).
Notwithstanding, there is an intrinsic connection between
reasoning based on incomplete items of evidence on the one
hand, and acts of will on the other hand, leading to decisions:
the two instances are connected in the sense that the former is
the point of departure of the latter (Biedermann et al., 2008). As
33The (National Research Council [NAS], 2009, p. 43) remarks on a similar
note that the “question is less a matter of whether each person’s fingerprints are
permanent and unique – uniqueness is commonly assumed – and more a matter
whether one can determine with adequate reliability that the finger that left an
imperfect impression at a crime scene is the same finger that left an impression
. . . in a file of fingerprints.”
34In view of that distinction Swinton Thomas LJ (R v Davies) remarked that it is
“fundamental that experts must not usurp the functions of the jury in a criminal
trial.”
35Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates [1953] SC 34, 40; nota bene this is a Scottish case,
which became also the leading authority in England and Wales, see e.g. R v Gilfoyle
[2001] 2 Cr App R 57, 67, CA.
much as the scientist cannot interfere with the judicial decision-
makers’ area of competence, the juridical decision-maker cannot
interfere with the process leading to the expert witness testimony,
especially its content. The focus, Justice Blackmun remarks,
“must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.”36 As long as these decision-
structures are a function of valid scientific methods, they cannot
per se be rejected or disregarded. Scientific conclusions cannot,
however, anticipate ultimate issues, i.e., elements of the respective
offense to be proved, let alone the verdict as such (Roberts and
Zuckerman, 2010, p. 490).
The Role of Formal Theories for Reasoning and
Decision Analysis
Through Sections “Transversal Overview of Current Empirical,
Normative and Doctrinal Understandings of Expert Witness
Testimony” and “Decisional Dimensions of Forensic Expert
Testimony” we have aimed at clarifying the intricacies of the
systemic relationship between forensic science and the law.
Naturally, this raises questions from a variety of viewpoints –
normative, descriptive and prescriptive – that, in many discourses
on the topic, are not well separated, and hence hinder progress
toward a resolution of opposing views.
Many of current debates focus on empirical and descriptive
aspects, such as the question of the extent to which witnesses
are testifying on the basis of knowledge, and whether the fact-
finders can appropriately assess such testimony to reach sound
judgments about the disputed events. It is, however, equally
important – in our view – to insist on the understanding
that structural features of expert witness testimony are actually
embedded in a legally structured decision-making process. There
are currently two main perspectives in which the decisional
dimension of expert witness testimony may be understood.
On an empirical account, claims have been raised that forensic
scientists should be subjected to empirical testing. As noted by
PCAST, “studies are required, in which many examiners render
decisions about many independent tests (typically, involving
“questioned” samples and one or more “known” samples) and the
error rates are determined” (President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology [PCAST], 2016, p. 143). Such research
leads to general measures of expert performance with respect to a
particular area of expertise and/or a given expert’s performance.
The benefit of this is the provision of information to help assess
whether experts, including their methods and techniques, are
able to do what they claim to do, and whether they are any
better in their tasks than lay persons. The obvious limitation of
the empirical perspective is, however, that such general expert
performance measures do not instruct, normatively, how to make
a sound decision (i.e., what to conclude at the end of a forensic
examination) in any given individual situation. The latter has to
do with the logic of decision and, hence, requires elements of
formal methods of reasoning and analysis, among which a prime
candidate is (normative) decision theory. Broadly speaking, the
purpose of decision theory is to assist decision-makers – in any
36Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Syllabus,
at 580.
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given case – in thinking about the relative merit of rival courses
of action when their outcomes cannot be known with certainty.
While this appears to be a good fit for the needs of operational
decision makers, there is debate over the possible uses of decision
theory since its first presentation in legal literature in the late
1960s. A recurrent critique is that one of the entailments of
decision theory, such as expected utility/loss, is not a relevant
criterion from a legal point of view because that there are several
other aspirations to which the legal process seeks to conform.
It is important to note, however, that this is a critique that
focuses on the descriptive and prescriptive adequacy of decision
theory, while leaving the fundamental question of how to actually
make a decision, and justifying it, unresolved. As the eminent
figure in decision theory, Howard Raiffa, has noted: “Even if
you don’t analyze your decision problem by the methodology
described in these lectures, you still must act. What will you do?”
(Redmayne, 1995, p. 272). We also see here a practical instance
of the generality tradeoff mentioned earlier in Section “Law
and Philosophy of Science”: formal theories assert coherence at
the level of detail at which they are applied, which depends on
the decision analyst’s intentions, (computational) capacities and
available resources (e.g., in terms of information, time, etc.). It
is pointless then to either claim a particular modeling result as
a solution for a larger decision problem, or in turn criticize the
model for a lack of completeness that it never claimed to have.
We join the above perspective in the sense that it places
the inevitability of decision in the first place, and as the
overarching perspective (see also Lindley, 1985). This burden
of decision, as we call it, has to be absorbed, from which
follows the imperative that decision-makers ought to think
about their decision problems sensibly, prior to making their
decision. The role of formal theories in this task is that of
helping individuals make up their minds, in a structured way,
about the fundamental ingredients of decision problems (i.e.,
states of nature, decisions, consequences, etc.). There is nothing
prescriptive in this perspective as such, though it provides
us with a critical analytical account of current practice. To
illustrate this, reconsider one of the currently most controversial
forensic reporting issues, that is the problem of deciding whether
or not a defendant, rather than an unknown person, is the
source of, for example, a DNA trace, a partial fingermark
or an item of handwriting – a process commonly known as
individualization (see Section “Key Controversies Over Selected
Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony”). Our general argument
throughout this paper, emphasizing the judiciary’s decision-
making prerogative, and the imperative to consider all findings,
not only scientific findings, is to deny scientists answering this
question. Firstly, because it would be an answer provided on an
issue (i.e., a proposition of interest), rather than a statement of
the value of forensic findings only. Secondly, because deferring
the decision to scientists would lead them into an impasse. The
impasse is due to the fact that any decision taken in the light of
uncertainty is bound to decision consequences, some of which
are undesirable (e.g. a false identification), and there is nothing
in the scientists’ scope of competence that entitles them to assess
the relative desirability or undesirability of those consequences
(Biedermann et al., 2008, 2016), neither qualitatively and even
less so quantitatively. The problematic turn on this is that
scientists who continue to make identification decisions, despite
this intricacy, will implicitly impose a stance with respect to
possible decision consequences to the judiciary, without telling
them that they do so, which raises problems of transparency.
An even further dimension of concern is that scientists may
not even be aware of the decisional dimensions, and their
implications, of their form of testimony. Taken together, these
intricacies have been recognized as the principal reason why
forensic ‘identification practice’ has become unscientific (Stoney,
1991, 2012).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In their paper on the “Individualization Fallacy” Saks and Koehler
(2008, p. 215) wonder why so many forensic scientists “ascribe
greater powers to their fields than the research supports.” A
Nietzschean “will to power,” masqueraded as individualization
claims, lack of understanding37 for the structure of legal
adjudication, the probabilistic (general) character of scientific
propositions, or simply an aspiration to ‘help solve the crime’ are
only a few possible answers. Our paper does not aspire to answer
this (empirical) question. Further, it is not helpful to fall back in
disputes between mainstream evidence scholarship and forensic
scientists. Efficient synergy between decision-makers and expert
witnesses is too crucial for any modern criminal justice system
to be conceptually or even institutionally crippled by a lack of
communication and mutual understanding of respective roles
and duties of the participants in the legal process. We purported,
thus, to clarify – descriptively and analytically – the dimensions in
which scientific knowledge, data and related expert assessments
manifest themselves in different operative systems, i.e., legal
adjudication on the one hand and core scientific theory and
practice on the other hand. The conceptual boundary between
model-based scientific conjectures and legally contextualized
decisions outlines, at the same time, the allocation of epistemic
duties and rights between expert witnesses and decision-makers
(fact-finders). This perspective diverges from and goes beyond
traditional discourses reduced mainly to questions such as
admissibility and weight of particular items of scientific evidence
because even if the latter issues are settled, the fundamental
question on how scientific evidence interfaces with decision
making in operational contexts remains an unresolved applied
problem. Stated otherwise, even if agreement can be found as
to whether an expert witness is appropriately testifying on the
basis of knowledge, the fact-finder will still need to intelligently
incorporate the witness’s testimony in the process of reaching a
judgment about the contested events.
When conclusions of forensic scientists do not confine
themselves to the scientific findings and their assigned probative
value, but amount to categorical assertions about propositions
(i.e., ‘this person is the source of this crime stain’), and hence
represent local decisions (to be distinguished from ultimate
decisions), the precept of factfinders controlling the decision
process is violated. As much as ultimate inferential conclusions
37Margot (2011, p. 796) has concisely expressed this as follows: “Forensic scientists
are proud to see themselves take such an important part in legal proceedings, failing
to recognize that they’re playing the tune of their masters.”
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(e.g., about the defendant’s liability) are never based solely on the
probability of particular propositions of interest, but also involve
aspects of juridical classification (Roberts and Zuckerman,
2010, pp. 133–137), conclusions about lower propositional
levels (e.g., inference of source; see Section “Key Controversies
Over Selected Aspects of Forensic Expert Testimony”) involve
value judgements regarding the risk of decision consequences
(e.g., false identification and, hence, false incrimination of a
defendant).
While not prescribing an answer to the above issues, the
role of formal methods of reasoning and decision analysis –
such as decision theory (Biedermann et al., 2008, 2016) – is to
bring these underlying tenets to the open, and to clarify what is
fundamentally at stake with any forensic conclusion. The insight
from such formal analysis shows, in particular, that the scope and
implications of forensic conclusions are much broader than what
is commonly thought, because of the required value judgements
(e.g., in terms of utilities/losses). The latter call upon a more active
role by participants of the legal process other than the scientist.
The understanding of forensic expert conclusions in a decisional
dimension thus can empower the different parties in the process
by showing that the processing of scientific evidence is a task that
encompasses broader considerations than those that a scientist
alone may address. This is entirely compatible with the view
that the ultimate assessment of “any particular piece of evidence,
scientific or otherwise, must always be assessed contextually, in
the light of its contribution to the case as a whole” (Aitken et al.,
2010, p. 70).
It remains the question of what role and position research in
judgment and decision making may have in the context the legal
adjudication. Over the past decades, literature on this topic has
developed extensively and in great depth, and with proponents
arguing in controversy about the merits of theoretical research
when considering the dynamics of real trials and the limitations
of what participants in the legal process are actually capable of
doing. These discussions led to valid points to be made from
all common analytical viewpoints, normative, descriptive and
prescriptive. In this paper, we have extended this perspective
to the particular interface between forensic science and the law
where, traditionally, the form and content of expert conclusions
have attracted critical discussions mainly in a probabilistic
perspective, but without giving due consideration to the fact
that expert testimony actually amounts to decisions being made
with respect to target propositions (e.g., concluding that ‘this
trace comes from this person’). Rethinking traditional forensic
reporting practices, in particular source identifications, in this
decisional dimension leads to two main conclusions.
First, while decision-makers in the context of legal
adjudication need a scientific basis as a starting point, scientific
models and forensic practitioners can at best facilitate the
cognitive access to empirical phenomena by providing a
systematic account going beyond common knowledge and
understanding, i.e., a decision-structure. However, decision-
makers need to “jump” (Stoney, 1991, p. 198) in order to render
a verdict. As much as model-based propositions (scientific
conclusions) cannot preempt decisions such as the ascription of
(criminal) liability, they also cannot preempt decisions regarding
forensic source attribution (i.e., concluding that a particular
trace or mark comes from a designated person of interest). The
main reason for this is that such conclusions depend on more
than scientific or other evidence alone. Moreover, modern legal
orders choose unequivocally and consistently to allocate the
decision-making prerogative to fact-finders (professional judges
or jurors), with a clear preference to education over deference.
Second, analyzing expert witness testimony through the lenses
of formal theories, in particular normative decision theory, shows
that the above allocation of duties and prerogatives actually
makes sense; however, the analysis does not claim to practically
facilitate the operation of the expert and fact-finder interface.
The latter is not a drawback of judgment and decision-making
research, but an insight that is valuable to guide ongoing reforms
of forensic science reporting practice (expert witness testimony),
as evidenced by the recent examples of scholarly works and policy
documents drawn from professional bodies and governmental
institutions presented throughout this paper.
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